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I. Introduction
As anyone with experience on either side of the human resources desk
can attest, our social media footprints are following us to work. Many
employers now report checking applicants’ social media presence prior to
hiring or even preliminary interviews, and popular-media advice on the
recommended sanitization procedure is almost a daily feature of one news
site or another.1 Some advice columns even caution that “reblogging”—the
common practice of referring others in one’s online network to content
published elsewhere—can cause controversial material to be associated
with a job applicant, with corresponding positive or negative effects.2
Employees and job applicants are well advised to note that employer-side
attorneys are advising their clients of ways to justify terminations based on
social media activity that might embarrass the company.3
1. See, e.g., Amy Levin-Epstein, Job Interview? Prep Your Facebook, Twitter
Profile, CBS NEWS (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505125_16257561846/job-interview-prep-your-facebook-twitter-profile/ (recommending detailed cleanup strategies, including leaving enough personal information to give an interesting personal
impression).
2. See id. (“Just because you didn’t initially post it doesn’t mean it won’t be
associated with your candidacy . . .”).
3. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. ROBBINS, ADVISING E-BUSINESSES Ch. 4, IX, § 4:69,
Disciplining or Terminating Employees for Online Activities (2012) (characterizing social
media websites as “a great way to obtain information about someone easily and at low cost,”
acknowledging the “tempt[ation] to discipline an employee for her online remarks,” and
offering general guidelines for crafting enforceable social media policies).
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Increasingly, similar implications are affecting future professionals
before they enter their chosen professions.4 Several recent cases have seen
colleges and universities sanctioning students for their online communications, particularly via the still-dominant social media site Facebook, when
the students’ postings were found to be incompatible with university rules.
Notably, one particular, narrow group of students—those enrolled in
undergraduate and graduate professional degree programs leading to
government-regulated professions—have found themselves uniquely
vulnerable to institutional discipline for their Facebook posts.5 As this Note
demonstrates, courts have found that such students can face legitimate
academic consequences for posts that demonstrate an alleged6 inability to
abide by the associated profession’s code of conduct, even when such statesanctioned punishment would seem to offend the First Amendment.7
Many prominent commentators have endorsed this emerging standard
of limited student free speech at public institutions of higher learning.8
4. See Katherine C. Chretien, et al., Online Posting of Unprofessional Content by
Medical Students, 302 JAMA 1309, 1309 (Sept. 23, 2009) (“Web 2.0 . . . risks broadcasting
unprofessional content that can reflect poorly on individuals, affiliated institutions, and the
medical profession.”).
5. See Scott Jaschik, A Cadaver, Facebook, Free Speech, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June
21, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/06/21/minnesota-supreme-courtupholds-punishment-student-over-facebook-posts (acknowledging that Tatro II “deals with
an issue relevant . . . to a range of health professions programs that expect students to adhere
to certain standards of professionalism, even before they become professionals”).
6. I use the word “alleged” here because, as will be seen later, the courts have in the
vast majority of cases chosen not to interrogate the appropriateness of student statements,
but rather engage in a level of judicial review that leads them (in cases the universities win)
to endorse as sufficient the university’s judgment of the speech’s appropriateness. Thus, the
allegation is, for the most part, also the judgment.
7. See infra Part III.B (summarizing and discussing professional school case law).
8. See, e.g., Neal H. Hutchens, Commentary, A Delicate Balance: Faculty Authority
to Incorporate Professionalism Standards into the Curriculum Versus College and
University Students’ First Amendment Rights, 270 ED. LAW. REPORTER 371, 371 (2011)
(arguing that incorporation of professional standards was appropriate in several recent
cases); Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification
Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382, (2013) (arguing that schools can legitimately police
student speech in professional degree programs because those programs “certify” graduates
as fit to serve in their professions); Jeffrey C. Sun, Neal H. Hutchens, & James D. Breslin, A
(Virtual) Land of Confusion with College Students’ Online Speech: Introducing the
Curricular Nexus Test, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 49 (2013) (suggesting a test allowing
universities to regulate off-campus, extracurricular student speech that reasonably relates to
legitimate pedagogical concerns). But see Andrew R. Kloster, Speech Codes Slipping Past
the Schoolhouse Gate: Current Issues in Students’ Rights, 81 UMKC L. REV. 617 (2013)
(describing professional standards cases as “permitting universities to use third-party
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Prior to 2011, most of the notable cases had involved school counseling
students who had refused to counsel non-heterosexual students in violation
of their avowed religious beliefs. However, the recently decided Tatro v.
University of Minnesota9 (hereinafter Tatro II10) saw this new jurisprudence
extended to a mortuary science student who made off-color jokes on her
Facebook page about her laboratory cadaver.11
The Tatro cases represent a potentially dangerous overreach of public,
educational institutional control over student speech. While the speech at
issue, in the professional student context, presents a reasonably nuanced
question as to constitutional protection, the persuasive authority that might
emerge from Tatro II threatens to leave too many other close questions on
the wrong side of the jurisprudential line. Sadly, Tatro’s untimely death12
regulation of student speech to do an end-run around settled First Amendment doctrine”).
9. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012) [hereinafter Tatro II]
(holding that a professional student’s First Amendment free speech rights were not violated
by a public university’s sanction for violation of conduct code based on established
professional conduct).
10. In this Note, “Tatro I” will be used to refer to Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d
811 (Minn. App. 2011) [hereinafter Tatro I], the Minnesota Court of Appeals case that
upheld the university’s disciplinary sanctions under familiar secondary-school standards,
discussed infra at Part III.A. Discussion of both Tatro cases is necessary both because of the
differing analytical frameworks between the two courts and because their account of the
factual record differs somewhat. See infra note 106 (discussing relevant factual disparity
between Tatro I and II).
11. See id. at 512–13 (summarizing content of Tatro’s Facebook posts).
12. See, e.g., Alyssa Creamer, Amanda Tatro Found Dead: University of Minnesota
Graduate Who Sued School for Punishment Over Facebook Posts, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(July 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/28/amanda-tatro-found-deadu_n_1635461.html (reporting Tatro’s death and collecting other news reports of her case).
Tatro, who was only 31 years old, was found dead in her home by her husband. Id. Several
news accounts indicate that Tatro did not have an easy life. Id. She apparently suffered
from a nervous system disorder related to a traumatic brain injury, though it is unclear
whether this was related to her death. Id. A former husband had sought a restraining order
against her in 2007, alleging that she was “very unstable” and had been hospitalized for a
drug overdose. See Emily Gurnon, Amanda Tatro, Who Challenged University of
Minnesota’s Facebook Punishment, Had Turbulent Life, PIONEER PRESS, June 27, 2012,
http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_20954862/amanda-tatro-who-challengeduniversity-minnesotas-facebook-comments. The former husband also alleged that Tatro had
undergone weapons training. Id. The restraining order was refused, on the grounds that
Tatro’s alleged conduct was merely “‘annoying’ behavior that appeared to be part of a bad
breakup . . . .” Id. It may be worth wondering whether Tatro’s Facebook behavior was
interpreted by her classmates in the context of what may have been a vaguely understood
reputation; at any rate, the posts, though initially investigated as potential threats, were
determined by police to be harmless. See infra note 16 (discussing police investigation of
Tatro’s Facebook posts).
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several days after her loss in the Minnesota Supreme Court likely the issue
in her own uniquely illustrative case.13 This Note will argue that this
watershed case gives too much “cover” to educational institutions that want
to protect their public image, and further suggests that even this concern is
better served by a hands-off approach when it comes to student social
media activity that does not rise to the level of a potential physical threat.
Part II will describe the complicated factual circumstances of Tatro II as
well as the previous (and notably different) adjudication of the same facts in
the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Part III will summarize the legal
framework that has guided student speech cases in various relevant
contexts—on- and off-campus, secondary and post-secondary, online and
off. Part IV will analyze and apply several existing theories of educational
speech to the professional student context presented in the Tatro cases, and
Part V will explore the potential ramifications of these cases on emerging
free speech problems. Finally, Part VI will offer two approaches to
regulating off-campus, online speech by professional students—one
couched in terms of “best practices” that might help a university avoid both
bad publicity and expensive litigation, as well as a legal framework that
discourages “unprofessional” speech that might be likened to false speech
under recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
II. Background: Tatro I and II
The details and procedural history of the Tatro case are somewhat
convoluted, in no small part because the case originated within a public
university. While an advanced undergraduate student in the Mortuary
Sciences program, and, importantly, enrolled in a human anatomy
laboratory course at the University of Minnesota, Amanda Tatro made the
following posts to her Facebook wall:14

13. Because the sanctions against Tatro were relatively slight, her grievance might not
be seen as one capable of repetition, yet evading review. One commenter has suggested,
however, that free speech claims might be seen as “belonging” to society (as opposed to the
individual litigants) if they “raise issues that are important to the living.” Kirsten Rabe
Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 783 (2009).
14. At the time of Tatro’s posts, Facebook users almost universally drafted their
“wall” posts as third-person sentences about themselves, to complement Facebook’s
interface convention that caused all posts to be immediately preceded by the user’s full
name. In recent years this convention has fallen away.
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• Amanda Beth Tatro Gets to play, I mean dissect, Bernie today. Let's
see if I can have a lab void of reprimanding and having my scalpel taken
away. Perhaps if I just hide it in my sleeve ... [November 12, 2009]
• Amanda Beth Tatro Is looking forward to Monday's embalming
therapy as well as a rumored opportunity to aspirate. Give me room,
lots of aggression to be taken out with a trocar. [December 6, 2009]
• Amanda Beth Tatro Who knew embalming lab was so cathartic! I
still want to stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar though.
Hmm ... perhaps I will spend the evening updating my “Death List # 5”
and making friends with the crematory guy. I do know the code ...
[December 7, 2009]
• Amanda Beth Tatro Realized with great sadness that my best friend,
Bernie, will no longer be with me as of Friday next week. I wish to
accompany him to the retort. Now where will I go or who will I hang
with when I need to gather my sanity? Bye, bye Bernie. Lock of hair in
15
my pocket. [Undated.]

The University police investigated these posts, but eventually
determined that Tatro did not pose a threat to the university community.16
Tatro was sanctioned by the university’s Campus Committee for
Student Behavior in response to her Facebook posts, which Tatro described
as “satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her school
experience.”17 Finding that Tatro had “violated the Student Conduct Code
and academic program rules governing the privilege of access to human
cadavers,” the Committee issued Tatro a failing grade for her anatomy
course.18 Additionally, the Committee ordered Tatro “to enroll in a clinical
ethics course; write a letter to mortuary-science department faculty
addressing the issue of respect within the department and profession; and
complete a psychiatric evaluation.”19 The specific “academic program
rules” Tatro violated were a prohibition against “blogging” about her
anatomy lab experience20 and treating human remains with inadequate
15. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 512–13 (Minn. 2012).
16. Id. at 513. When interviewed by campus police, Tatro stated that the potentially
threatening content of the posts were references to favorite movies—for instance, “Death
List # 5” was a reference to the two-part Quentin Tarantino film Kill Bill. Id.
17. Id. at 511 (quoting court filing by petitioner Tatro).
18. Id.
19. Tatro I, 800 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. App. 2011).
20. See id. at 818 (referring to anatomy lab course rule that “[b]logging about the
anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection is not allowable”).
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respect.21 In Tatro I,22 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions
on the theory that Tatro’s actions “‘materially and substantially disrupt[ed]’
the work and discipline of the university,” particularly the university’s
anatomy bequest program, through which living donors pledge their bodies
for the training of future mortuary science and medical students.23
While the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the sanctions on Tatro, it
dispensed with the lower court’s reasoning, holding instead that “a
university does not violate the free speech rights of a student enrolled in a
professional program when the university imposes sanctions for Facebook
posts that violate academic program rules that are narrowly tailored and
directly related to established professional conduct standards.”24 This rule,
the court stated, would “limit the potential for a university to create
overbroad restrictions that would impermissibly reach into a university
student’s personal life outside of and unrelated to the [student’s
professional degree] program.”25
Looking forward, the value of the Tatro case is its contribution to a
discussion not of the university’s interest in maintaining an environment
that is physically safe or otherwise free of disruption, but rather of a threesided relationship between universities, the professions, and the students
trained for those professions by universities.26
21. See id. (referencing the following anatomy lab course rules that “[h]uman material
should always be handled with the greatest respect[,] [t]he body should be appropriately
draped whenever possible[,]” and “[c]onversational language . . . outside the laboratory
should be respectful and discreet”). The Minnesota Court of Appeals accepted Tatro’s
argument that because the rule referred specifically to draping the body, the rule “only
applie[d] to the physical handling of the cadaver,” and thus she had not violated this part of
the rules. Id.
22. Id. at 822 (holding that mortuary science student’s Facebook posts violated
conduct restrictions of laboratory course and constituted a substantial disruption of curricular
activities, justifying academic sanctions).
23. See id. at 821 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 513 (1969)). Tinker and its progeny are discussed in detail infra Part III.A. For a
thorough analysis of Tatro I, including a persuasive argument that the Tinker standard
should not apply to college students, see Meggen Lindsay, Note, Tinker Goes to College:
Why High School Free Speech Standards Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary Students—
Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1470 (2012).
24. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012).
25. Id.
26. Of course, First Amendment analysis is only called for in Tatro and the other cases
under discussion in this Note because the students and programs in question are housed in
public universities. Just as obviously, however, many professional students get their training
at private universities, where Constitutional rights apply with less, if any, force.
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III. The Existing First Amendment Legal Framework for Electronic, OffCampus Student Speech
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has applied the same
analytical frameworks used in secondary school cases to the college and
university context.27 Thus, an analysis of the secondary school cases is
important, even though the challenged behavior of a high school student
may seem comically immature by comparison with the concerns of a
university, and the interests served by compulsory education of minors is
significantly different than that served by elective education of adults.28
A. School Speech Cases
As the Supreme Court first famously stated in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,29 teachers and students alike do
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate.”30 While Tinker laid a strong baseline for student
free speech in public schools, the Court emphasized that students’ free
speech rights are cabined by the legitimate interests of schools.31 The Court
held that speech that did not “substantially interfere with the work of the
school or impinge upon the rights of other students” was not subject to
legitimate school restriction.32 In describing a high school’s decision to
forbid the wearing of black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War, the
Court noted that “an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might
result from the [students’] expression” was an insufficiently compelling
interest to justify the restriction on First Amendment speech rights.33

27. See infra note 69 and accompanying text (describing rationale for applying
secondary school case law in the college setting).
28. See infra Part III.A for a more thorough discussion of this issue.
29. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (holding
that on-campus student speech that materially disrupted the school environment was not
subject to First Amendment protection).
30. Id. at 506.
31. See id. at 513 (explaining that students’ free speech rights did not prohibit a
school’s “reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted
circumstances”).
32. Id. at 509.
33. Id. at 510.
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The Court has departed from this speech-friendly stance in later cases.
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,34 a student who delivered a
nominating speech on behalf of a fellow student seeking a class office. In
his speech, he “referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic,
and explicit sexual metaphor” was permissibly sanctioned by the high
school.35 Fraser is interesting for its departure from Tinker as to speech the
Court declared “offensively lewd and indecent . . . unrelated to any political
viewpoint . . . [that] undermine[d] the school’s basic educational
mission.”36 The Court was also at pains to point out that the speech was
less protected because it was made on school grounds by a child.37
Subsequent cases further develop the importance of both the location of the
interdicted speech and the maturity of the speaker. The more mature the
student, the more such speech is likely to be protected. Conversely, the
more closely connected to an educational mission, and the less politically
grounded the expression, the less likely constitutional protections will be
triggered.38
The power of school officials to sanction less offensive speech under
the color of curriculum and school sponsorship was further developed in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlheimer,39 where school officials cut two
pages of articles from a student newspaper.40 The articles in question were
substantially less arguably “offensive” than the material found
objectionable in Fraser—one described the experiences of students who
had dealt with teenage pregnancy, the other the effect on a student of her

34. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding that
student’s lewd, sexually graphic on-campus speech was not protected by the First
Amendment).
35. Id. at 677–78 (1986).
36. Id. at 687.
37. See id. at 682 (“It does not follow . . . that simply because the use of an offensive
form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a
political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school.”).
38. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 402–03 (2007) (dismissing the dissent’s
argument that the offending Bong HiTs 4 Jesus banner was part of a “political debate over
the criminalization of marijuana”).
39. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that “educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns”).
40. See id. at 262 (detailing school principal’s decision to remove the articles from the
student publication).
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parents’ divorce.41 Critical to distinguishing the situation from that in
Tinker was the fact that the student newspaper’s readers might mistakenly
attribute the articles’ content to the school, and not their authors alone. The
Court stated that the articles “might reasonably [be] perceive[d] to bear the
imprimatur of the school” and therefore could “fairly be characterized as
part of the school curriculum.”42 Furthermore, because the newspaper was
produced exclusively by members of a particular journalism class, for
which student-editors received a grade, the Court recognized that
“[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control” over such curricular
speech “to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is
designed to teach . . . so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”43 The importance of the paper’s place in
the journalism curriculum (i.e., as a graded exercise) is inseparable, in
Hazelwood, from the fact that the school published—and thus could be seen
to endorse—its contents. Future cases, especially professionalism cases,
make the distinction important.
Off-campus speech is subject to less regulation.44 A federal district
court recently summarized the current state of constitutional regulation of
off-campus speech this way: “[S]tatements are protected under the First
Amendment and not punishable by school authorities unless they are true
threats or are reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are
so egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption
in that environment.”45 This standard has the additional benefit of
alignment with the common sense notion that outside of school, whatever
rights students do “shed . . . at the schoolhouse gate,” they may pick up on
their way home.46
Notably, however, what constitutes the geographical and metaphysical
boundaries of the school grounds for the purposes of institutional control
over student speech is no simple matter of walls and fences. In Morse v.
Frederick,47 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a group of students who
41. See id. at 263 (describing the content of the articles removed from the paper).
42. Id. at 271.
43. Id. at 271–73.
44. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (“Had Fraser delivered the same
speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.”).
45. See R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (D.
Minn. 2012) (summarizing the current state of governing law).
46. Tinker, 503 U.S. at 506.
47. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396 (2007) (holding that a high school principal did not violate
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displayed a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” along the Olympic
Torch Relay Route were subject to the kinds of restrictions on their speech
that would apply if they were inside the school or attending a schoolsponsored activity.48 The offending students—one of whom was so late for
school that at the time of the relay he was just arriving for the day—were
across the street from the school, and thus not even physically on school
property.49 Interestingly, the Court also dispensed with any idea that a
banner censored by school authorities because it could be construed to
promote the use of illegal controlled substances should be analyzed as
political speech (and thus potentially deserving of greater protection),
characterizing it instead in terms of Frederick’s desire to get on TV with his
friends.50
Unlike primary and secondary public schools, colleges and universities
do not exercise “custodial and tutelary” care over their students, such as to
“permit[] a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised
over free adults.”51 Thus, while Tinker and its progeny have been used in
analyzing higher education speech cases, such cases are rare.52

a student’s First Amendment speech rights by confiscating a banner bearing the phrase
“Bong HiTs 4 Jesus” on the basis that the message promoted illegal drug use).
48. Id. at 397.
49. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (describing the physical location of
respondent Joseph Frederick, who was “late to school that day” and “joined his friends” (all
but one of whom were [school classmates] across the street from the school to watch the
event)).
50. See id. at 402–03 (stating that while Frederick’s motive for displaying the
banner—to get on television—did not mitigate its content, the pro-drug message, his lack of
political motivation stripped it of any First Amendment protection as a contribution to public
debate). The Court, per Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a six-justice majority, sparred
with Justice Stevens in dissent over this point. Justice Stevens questioned the Court’s
readiness to endorse the principal’s determination that the banner promoted drug use, and
called the message “nonsense.” Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, he
expressed concern in the event the banner did express that view. Speculating “whether the
fear of disapproval by those in the majority is silencing opponents of the war on drugs,”
Justice Stevens wrote “[s]urely our national experience with alcohol [prohibition] should
make us wary of dampening speech suggesting—however inarticulately—that it would be
better to tax and regulate marijuana than to persevere in a futile effort to ban its use
entirely.” Id. at 448 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
52. See Tatro I, 800 N.W. 2d 811, 821–22 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that Tatro’s
Facebook posts “materially and substantially disrupt[ed] the work and discipline of the
university” using the Tinker standard).
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B. Professional School Cases

The two leading cases in the realm of professional students’ First
Amendment rights arise in school counseling programs. They depart from
the prior discussion inasmuch as they represent hybrid claims in which
students asserted religious beliefs, communicated through expressive
conduct, that were found to interfere with the conduct code of their chosen
profession. In Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley,53 Jennifer Keeton, a student
enrolled in a graduate-level counseling program at Augusta State
University, made statements reflecting disapproval (based on her religious
beliefs) of members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered
(LGBTQ) population as well as her belief that non-heterosexuals suffered
from a mental illness that could (and should) be treated.54 Keeton’s
professors believed these statements indicated that she would not be able to
practice in the school’s clinical program (or beyond) according to the
professional standards of the American Counseling Association (ACA),
compliance with which was a requirement of the counseling program.55
Believing that she could not effectively complete the remediation plan her
professors prescribed before allowing her to work with student clients in the
university’s clinical program, Keeton withdrew from the program and
sued.56 While school officials informed Keeton that she “was not being
asked to alter her personal religious beliefs,” they did stress that failure to

53. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that a
university’s dismissal of a school counseling student who indicated that she would not
affirm the sexual identity of non-heterosexual students, as well as the non-marital sexual
activity of unmarried students, did not violate First Amendment speech protections).
54. See id. at 868 (“[Keeton] expressed to professors in class and fellow classmates in
and out of class that she believed that the GLBTQ population suffers from identity
confusion, and that she intended to attempt to convert students from being homosexual to
heterosexual.”).
55. See id. at 869 (quoting relevant code provisions: “Counselors respect the dignity of
clients . . .. [and] do not condone or engage in discrimination based on . . . gender identity,
sexual orientation, marital status/partnership . . . or any basis proscribed by law.”).
56. See id. at 870–71 (describing a remediation plan and Keeton’s reaction to it). The
plan set out by Keeton’s professors would have required her to read peer-reviewed scholarly
articles on “improving counseling effectiveness for the GLBTQ population . . . familiarize
herself with [a GLBTQ counseling association’s] Competencies for Counseling Gay and
Transgender Clients” as well as attend GLBTQ community events and relevant counseling
seminars, all with the intent of increasing Keeton’s exposure to, and presumably tolerance
for, members of the GLBTQ population she might someday encounter in her counseling
practice. Id. at 870.
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complete the remediation plan would result in her dismissal from the
counseling program.57
Since Keeton’s statements were not a publication or an address, the
Eleventh Circuit viewed the counseling program itself as the “forum” for
First Amendment purposes.58 Because the court deemed the counseling
program a non-public forum, the court analyzed the restriction on Keeton’s
speech—the remediation plan—for reasonableness and content-neutrality.59
The court applied Hazelwood in two ways, finding, first, that the clinical
program was a “‘school-sponsored expressive activit[y],’ as those who
receive counseling in the program and members of the general public
‘might reasonably perceive [it] to bear the imprimatur of the school.”60
Second, both the clinical program and the remediation plan were “part of
the school curriculum . . . supervised by faculty members and designed to
impart particular knowledge or skills to [Keeton].”61 Thus, the school’s
sanction of Keeton’s expressions of disapproval of LGBTQ individuals
could be characterized as an “unwillingness to abide by [the university’s]
curriculum.”62
Julea Ward, a graduate counseling student at Eastern Michigan
University, voiced similar, if less aggressive, concerns about counseling
gay clients.63 Whereas Keeton had expressed an intention to practice
conversion therapy, Ward consistently expressed only disapproval of
homosexuality, as well as extramarital sex and some other heterosexual
conduct.64 And whereas Keeton was not allowed to enter her program’s
57. Id. at 871.
58. See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We . . . find
that ASU’s counseling program constitutes a nonpublic forum.”).
59. See id. at 872 (“[As a nonpublic forum], school officials ‘may impose restrictions
on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral’ . . . Accordingly, we must ask two
questions . . . (1) whether the remediation plan was a reasonable restriction on her speech;
and (2) whether the remediation plan was viewpoint neutral.”).
60. Id. at 875 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260, 271).
61. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260, 271).
62. Id. at 878. The degree to which the court relied on the ACA standards themselves
is unclear. The court analyzed the sanctions, finding them to be reasonable in light of the
ACA standards, but did not address the ACA standards themselves.
63. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In three years with the
program, Julea Ward frequently expressed a conviction that her faith (Christianity)
prevented her from affirming a client’s same-sex relationships as well as certain
heterosexual conduct, such as extra-marital relationships.”).
64. See id. at 729–30 (summarizing Ward’s religious convictions).
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clinical program without completing a remediation plan, Ward was already
practicing in a supervised clinic and had counseled two student-clients
before her beliefs allegedly came into conflict with her professional
conduct.65 Rather than expressing her disapproval in front of any student
whose sexuality troubled her, Ward contacted her professor and supervisor
with a request to refer her third client, who was gay, to another counselor.66
At the behest of two of her professors, Ward participated in an “informal
meeting . . . . designed ‘to assist [Ward] in finding ways to improve [her]
performance or to explore the option of . . . voluntarily leaving the
program.’”67 Ward agreed with her professors that “the development of a
remediation plan would not be possible,” and after a formal review, was
forced to leave the program.68 Unlike Keeton, who had merely expressed
views that suggested she could not follow ACA guidelines in the future,
Ward was informed by her professors that she had already failed to follow
them.69
In its analysis of Ward’s free speech claim, the court made several
novel observations about the university free-speech environment in light of
Hazelwood. First of all, Hazelwood—a high school case—was applicable
at the college level.70 Second, the increased maturity of college students
did not necessarily decrease the extent to which their speech could be
validly restricted—rather, the voluntary nature of higher education gave
prospective students the opportunity “to learn what a curriculum requires
before applying to the school and before matriculating there.”71
Tatro sits somewhat uneasily alongside the professional cases.
Whereas Ward and Keeton made their feelings known to their instructors
65. See id. at 731 (noting that Ward was enrolled in the clinical program and had
counseled two students before the incident for which she was disciplined).
66. See id. (detailing Ward’s actions upon realizing, from a review of his file prior to
their first meeting, that her next client would be a gay student who sought counseling related
to his intimate relationships).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing communication by a
professor that Ward had violated two sections of the ACA code of ethics by “imposing
values that are inconsistent with counseling goals” and “engag[ing] in discrimination based
on . . . sexual orientation”) (substitutions in original).
70. See id. at 734 (“[F]or the same reason [the Hazelwood] test works for students who
have not yet entered high school . . . it works for students who have graduated from high
school. The key word is student.”).
71. Id.
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directly—Ward even going so far as to issue what might be fairly termed a
warning—Tatro’s supposed inability to perform according to professional
standards was determined indirectly, through report of her Facebook posts
to others.72 Additionally, Keeton and Ward were—or were set to—practice
their professions with clients through a clinical training exercise.73 Tatro,
by contrast, was merely involved in a laboratory course using an
anonymous donor,74 arguably an environment with little, if any, impact on
the population served by practicing morticians. Lastly, the counseling cases
both involve religious convictions, whereas Tatro’s Facebook posts (and
corresponding attitudes toward her profession) were secular. The speech
claims of Ward and Keeton, though, are no stronger for their invocation of
another First Amendment right, for, as the Tenth Circuit has indicated, “the
religious nature of [a speech claim] is not determinative . . . [t]he Supreme
Court has never held that religious speech is entitled to more protection
than non-religious speech.”75
In Ward, the university initially won its motion for summary judgment
in the district court. Reversing, the Sixth Circuit highlighted a conflict
between the program’s ACA-based ethical requirements and its actions
toward Ward:
[t]he key problem with the university’s position is not the adoption of
this anti-discrimination policy, the existence of the practicum class or
even the values-affirming message the school wants students to
understand and practice. It is that the school does not have a no-referral
policy for practicum students and adheres to an ethics code that permits
values-based referrals in general.76

As in Tatro, the counseling program required clinical students to abide
by the relevant professional standards, in this case those of the American

72. See Tatro I, 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. App. 2011) (noting that Tatro contacted
the media after she was told by University Police not to come to campus pending further
investigation, but before the office of student conduct submitted its formal complaint against
her).
73. See Ward, 667 F.3d at 730 (describing actual client-contact aspect of clinical
program); see also Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 869 (same).
74. See Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012) (describing laboratory course as
relying on donated human cadavers under the same program as that supplying medical and
dental schools, as opposed to performing volunteer funerary duties).
75. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1292 n. 13 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995)).
76. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012).
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Counseling Association (ACA).77 However, unlike the Minnesota Supreme
Court, the Sixth Circuit was willing to engage (or at least order the district
court to engage) in a careful reading of the relevant conduct code provision
rather than deferring to the university’s supposedly academic
determination. The court stated that it was possible for a jury to decide that,
by requesting that her client be referred to another counselor, she had in fact
prevented her own potential discrimination against that client, thus
upholding the relevant ACA standard.78
Curiously, the Sixth Circuit noted that “the university setting [does
not] invariably mean that educators have less discretion over their
curriculum and class-oriented speech” than high school teachers.79 Because
they are not compelled to enroll and can presumably make themselves
aware of curricular requirements—even speech-related ones—“[w]hen a
university lays out a program’s curriculum or class requirements for all to
see, it is the rare day when a student can exercise a First Amendment veto
over them.”80 This view has been criticized by scholars who argue that
university students, because of their maturity, should be entitled to more,
not less, freedom of expression.81
One common theme in the professional standards cases is the courts’
adoption of the secondary-school doctrine permitting greater speech
restrictions where student speech “might reasonably perceive[d] to bear the
imprimatur of the school.”82 In Keeton, for example, the court determined
77. See id. at 731 (“The counseling program’s student handbook incorporates the ACA
code of ethics and tells students, including practicum students, to follow it.”).
78. See id. at 735 (analyzing language in the ACA code of ethics that “Counselors [1]
are aware of their own values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and [2] avoid imposing
values that are inconsistent with counseling goals”). Interestingly enough, not only were
Ward’s orthodox Christian views—and the fact that they precluded her from counseling gay
clients—known to her instructors, see id., she had previously written a paper anticipating
situations identical to the one that resulted in her expulsion. See Ward v. Wilbanks, No.
09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428, at 1 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2010) (“[Ward] wrote ‘[i]n
situations were [sic] the value differences between a counselor and client are not amenable,
‘standard practice’ requires that the counselor refer his/her client to someone capable of
meeting their needs.’”). Even more interestingly, Ward received “a perfect score” on the
paper. Id.
79. Ward, 667 F.3d at 734.
80. Id.
81 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J.
821, 879 (2008) (referring to college campuses as marketplaces of ideas and arguing that
restrictions on college student speech are “less likely to be marketplace enhancing” than
those on younger students).
82. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlheimer, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
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that members of the public—and, more importantly, clients taking
advantage of the student counseling clinical services—could reasonably
attribute the speech of a student counselor to the university sponsoring the
program.83 In the Tatro cases, the University of Minnesota was clearly
concerned that her expressions would affect the cadaver donation program,
an outcome only possible if her allegedly disrespectful demeanor were
attributed to her training program, and thus, the university.84
C. Social Media Cases
Ordinarily, posts to social networking sites like Facebook would seem
to be fairly clear examples of non-school sponsored or “off-campus”
speech, and in fact, several cases have recognized broad protections for
such posts.85 Furthermore, electronic speech that originates off-campus
cannot be “brought” onto campus through the actions of another party.86
Two recent Third Circuit cases grappled with students who made
intentionally offensive social media profiles of secondary-school principals
using images drawn from official school websites.87 In both cases,
83. See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875 (applying Hazelwood to
clinical counseling student’s refusal to counsel gay clients).
84. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 513 (Minn. 2012) (“[T]he Anatomy Bequest
Program received letters and calls from donor families and the general public who expressed
concerns about Tatro's lack of professionalism, poor judgment, and immaturity. Others
questioned the University about the steps it would take to prevent something like this from
happening in the future.”).
85. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that
student who created “lewd and offensive” Facebook profile purporting to be school
principal’s, using a picture from the school’s website but his own computer, was beyond the
reach of the school’s power to discipline); see also J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650
F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding, similarly, that a middle school student’s fake MySpace
profile of a principal using “adult language and sexually explicit content” was protected offcampus speech in spite of school’s policy against student use of such language).
86. See Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 933 (declining to hold that off-campus
activities could be deemed to have occurred on school grounds when printouts of the
offending page were brought to school by a student, on the principal’s orders).
87. For reasons not wholly relevant here, the fake social media profile cases call to
mind the recent phenomenon of fake celebrity or public official Twitter profiles. Some of
these profiles are incredibly popular and are even coming to be recognized as a kind of art.
See, e.g., Sarah Fitzmaurice, Who to Follow on Twitter? Not the Real Stars . . . The Fake
Profiles are Far Funnier, THE DAILY MAIL [UK], Feb. 17, 2011, available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1358008/Who-follow-Twitter-Not-real-stars-fake-profiles-far-funnier.html (praising fake profiles purporting to represent, among others,
the Queen of England, and encouraging readers to follow the fake profiles instead of the real
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however, the students used their own computer equipment and did not
construct the profiles at school.88 The court refused to adopt “a rule that
allows school officials to punish any speech by a student that takes place
anywhere, at any time, as long as it is about the school or a school official,
is brought to the attention of a school official, and is deemed ‘offensive.’”89
Professional education presents a scenario in which traditionally nonacademic conduct can plausibly be treated as if it were curricular, because
such programs arguably must provide an education in professional
conduct.90 If one of the objectives of public education is to “inculcate
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system,” then a parallel, perhaps even more practical objective of
professional education is a similar inculcation of fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of that profession.91 Counselors must be
inclusive and affirming. Lawyers must protect their clients’ secrets.
Morticians must be respectful of the dead. Professional schools will quite
naturally seek to keep a tight rein on student conduct, since the public—and
scholars—may attribute bad professional behavior to the quality of
education provided in the professional schools.92
One interesting thread that appears in the relevant cases is the degree
to which students had advance notice that their expressions violated a
conduct standard. In Fraser, for example, the student who gave a sexually
indecent speech in a school-sponsored forum had been advised by two of
his teachers that the content—which they reviewed in advance—would be

ones).
88. See Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 920 (noting that the student made the
offending fake profile at home); see also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205,
216 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e do not think that the First Amendment can tolerate the School
District stretching its authority into Justin’s grandmother’s home and reaching Justin while
he is sitting at her computer after school . . .”).
89. Id.
90. See Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Enforcement of Law Schools’ Non-Academic Honor
Codes: A Necessary Step Towards Professionalism?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 634, 636 (2011)
(arguing that law schools present a singular opportunity for inculcating future lawyers with
“meaningful training in professionalism”).
91. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.675, 681(1986) (quoting Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979)) (substitutions in original).
92. See Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, supra note 90, at 652 (“Judging by the number of
reported complaints of unprofessional behavior and the general demise of the reputation of
the profession [of law], it is apparent that the cursory treatment of professionalism in the
historical law school tenure is deficient.”).
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“inappropriate” and “might have ‘severe consequences.””93 The Ward
court’s warning that university students could make themselves aware of
curricular requirements prior to enrolling in particular programs seems to
echo this idea.94 While it is certainly true of certain aspects of the
professions that an applicant needs to be aware of what he or she is signing
up for—medical, mortuary, and law students alike may be expected to put
aside a certain level of squeamishness about blood and other bodily
fluids—extending the curriculum’s control over outputs as well as inputs
may give universities too much power.
D. Reconciling Academic Freedom with Academic Speech Restrictions:
“Institutional Free Speech”
One scholar, Joseph Blocher, has argued that institutions that tend to
increase the free flow of information—those that enhance the marketplace
of ideas—should be granted judicial deference only inasmuch as those
institutions do, in fact, improve that marketplace.95 Professor Blocher’s
work is a modification of economic theories that make the same claim
about financial and material goods markets and the institutions which tend
to increase economic efficiency and decrease transaction costs.96 While this
“New Institutional First Amendment” explains and justifies all of the
Supreme Court’s recent rulings on middle- and high-school restrictions on
speech,97 Professor Blocher argues that colleges and universities
“contribution to the efficiency of the marketplace of ideas . . . does not
require or justify extensive internal speech regulations.”98
Blocher likens educational institutions to commercial institutions by
observing that “[u]niversities lower information search costs by making
93. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678.
94. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting voluntariness of
university coursework and availability of information to potential students).
95. See Blocher, supra note 81 at 880 (“Universities are thus entitled to institutional
deference when it comes to speech regulations that improve, not limit, the free flow of
information and ideas.”).
96. See id. at 838–47 (describing “new institutional economics” theory recognizing
role of “institutions that regularize interactions and lower transaction costs,” justifying
lessened government regulation).
97. See id. at 872–76 (analyzing Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse in terms of new
institutional first amendment theory and concluding that recent decisions “demonstrate[d] an
increasing institutional awareness”).
98. Id. at 879.
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ideas and information widely available and more easily accessible . . . [and]
lower search and measurement costs for students and faculty by equipping
them with better analytic tools with which to evaluate new ideas.”99 Like
repeat commercial players, then, universities have a vested interest in
abiding by the norms established through consistent institutional practice—
the norms of the ideological market.100
While purporting to deny universities the sort of power to regulate
speech that may be more appropriate in high schools, Professor Blocher’s
theory still grants extensive institutional deference to universities, and
perhaps more troubling, the power to determine what will fall within that
deference.101 It is far from clear whether Facebook posts like Tatro’s, or
religious positions like Ward’s, would be included within the realm of
market-enhancing expressions that could be seen as contributing to the
intellectual discourse of mortuary science. Even identifying the relevant
inquiry may be difficult—is the appropriateness of the applicable
professional guidelines themselves an open intellectual question? What
about whether a particular statement falls inside or outside those guidelines’
boundaries? Blocher identifies the possibility of institutional abuse and
asks: “What happens when otherwise ‘good’ institutions apply their internal
rules in a way that does not advance the marketplace of ideas? Does an
educational institution—which would otherwise be entitled to great
deference from courts—still get deference when it limits speech for reasons
unrelated to the marketplace of ideas?”102
For Blocher, the answer is no, but only because individual universities
who break with traditional speech-promoting norms are not representative
of the “institutions” to which they belong when they do so.103 To determine
whether an educational organization, such as an individual university, had
misapplied the relevant institutional norms, courts would have to conduct a
harder look than is typical in academic cases—a task Blocher feels is within

99. Id. at 857.
100. See id. (describing universities’ incentives to abide by the standards set by the
community of higher education institutions).
101. See id. at 856 (noting that the comparison to economic institutions is apt because
market efficiencies are what determine the institutional norms established by these market
players).
102. Id. at 860.
103. See id. (identifying the difference between “institutions,” like academia, and
“organizations” like, e.g., Duke University).
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the competence of the court.104 The Sixth Circuit’s remand in Ward may
indicate that at least some judges are willing to undertake such a case-bycase analysis in the case of professional codes applied to students.
Another potential area of conflict can arise between ideological
institutions within a single entity.
A university is not an ideological
monolith, but is arguably composed of several (ideological) market-shaping
institutions. As Professor Blocher points out, a university’s students,
faculty, and administration may have different interests to protect in any
clash over speech.105 “Disaggregat[ing] the institution” of academia,
however, reveals even more composite institutions than Blocher
identifies.106 As the recent Penn State sex-abuse scandal revealed in
horrific fashion, collegiate athletics are an institutional force so powerful
that they can overcome many of the larger and ostensibly dominant
ideological institutions represented by an individual university.107
Not only may different organizational parts of a university have
different ideological interests, different academic units108 may assume
differing relationships from one another to the ideological institutions they
represent. Professional schools may have a different role to play in the
marketplace of ideas than the traditional academic departments. Whereas
the academic departments can be more exclusively devoted to the
production of knowledge itself, professional schools are obligated by their
mission to produce qualified employees, not only to individual sectors of
the economy but often to specific positions within those sectors (law
schools, for example, train only lawyers and not paralegals). A professional
104. See id. at 862.
Determining whether an organization is misapplying its institutional norms
would, of course, require courts to investigate the content and application of
those norms. But that would be no more difficult . . . than their responsibility to
investigate . . . whether a particular limitation on speech amounts to viewpoint
discrimination.
105. See id. at 878 (“[W]ho exactly is it that ‘challenges conventional wisdom,’ . . . ?”).
106. Id.
107. See FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COUNSEL REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO
THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY, 14 (July 12, 2012),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/12/sports/ncaafootball/13pennstate
-document.html (finding that the University’s President acted in concert with the Athletic
Director and Head Football Coach to conceal repeated instances of sexual abuse from the
Board of Trustees).
108. In this context, it is interesting to recall that the different academic units are often
known as “colleges”—“College of Liberal Arts”, “College of Engineering,” etc.
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school, then, has obligations not only to inculcate its students with the
professional and behavioral norms of the profession it serves, but also to
(reasonably) guarantee the professional suitability of its graduates—it must
produce graduates who are fit to serve. In sensitive professions, this fitness
could include minimal or nonexistent controversiality, which could in
theory extend to a student’s social media presence. A more conservative
assessment of the traditional sphere of academic matters, however, might
exclude social media expressions from a college’s realm of academic
authority—or at least limit the university’s role to education, rather than
enforcement.
Emily Gold Waldman expresses a contrary view, arguing that
professional academic programs perform a “certifying” function by
“signing off on their students’ fitness to enter the profession in question.”109
Thus, schools can plausibly argue that the Hazelwood standard should
apply, not because their speech bears the school’s “imprimatur,” but rather
because the graduates themselves bear it.110 Dovetailing with the idea of
universities as First Amendment actors, Professor Waldman even suggests
that the policing of its future graduates’ speech can be seen as the
university’s protected speech act.111 Such control is appropriate, Waldman
argues, as long as the university or program can “articulate the nature of
their concern and explain why it was indeed legitimate in light of
professional standards and expectations.”112
There are two potential problems with this theory. The first is that it
barely places any burden on a degree-granting entity. All degree programs
arguably place some kind of university-imprimatur of fitness on their
graduates, in the sense that they “certify” that a student has obtained a
threshold amount of subject-matter knowledge. Likewise, their grade point
averages “certify” a particular level of competence in that subject matter—
even in the age of grade inflation. In today’s job market, it would not be
hard for any university program to claim employability as a legitimate
pedagogical concern.

109. Waldman, supra note 8, at 383.
110. Id. at 405.
111. See id. at 405–06 (noting that “by facilitating professional students’ entry into the
field . . . the university is engaging in its own sort of speech” and describing the granting of a
degree as an implicit statement that the graduate is “fit to enter the profession”).
112. Id. at 407.
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The second problem is that other entities are ultimately responsible for
a professional’s fitness.
Governmentally-sanctioned agencies are
frequently responsible for licensing professionals—in the case of a law
school graduate, for example, numerous barriers—the bar exam, character
and fitness review, even the Multistate Professional Responsibility test—
stand between earning a juris doctorate and becoming a lawyer.
Furthermore, assigning responsibility for a professional’s fitness to his or
her alma mater could allow individual employers to lean too heavily on
institutional “certification.”
E. Are Facebook Posts “Private” or “Public” Speech?
The Tatro court emphasized the public nature of Facebook posts,
noting that her privacy settings allowed her posts to be read by “Friends”
and “Friends of Friends.”113 This setting allows posts to be disseminated
not only to people the user actively admits to her network, but also to
people those users admit to their networks.114 The court characterized this
level of security as the functional equivalent of “blogging” (which was
expressly forbidden on the laboratory course’s syllabus).115 While a
potentially large group of people, however, this setting is in fact finite, and
could be argued to fall short of general publication.
Determining whether Facebook posts are public or private is critical in
determining whether a student, like, Tatro, whose posts may violate speech
restrictions have acted unprofessionally. According to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, Tatro’s posts were public: “[T]he University is not
sanctioning Tatro for a private conversation, but for Facebook posts that
could be viewed by thousands of Facebook users and for sharing the
Facebook posts with the news media.”116 Because of the inconsistency
between the lower court’s and the Supreme Court’s decisions, it is not
possible to know just how widely Tatro’s Facebook network was—whether
the posts were visible to hundreds or thousands of visitors.117 Further
113. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012).
114 See Choose Who You Share With, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/459
934584025324/ (under “Your Audience Options,” select “What audiences can I choose from
when I share?”) (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (defining various privacy levels for Facebook
posts).
115 Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d at 512.
116. Id. at 523.
117. Compare Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d at 523 (stating that sanctions were based on

570

20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 547 (2014)

complicating the situation is the issue of Tatro’s sharing of her posts with
media outlets, and the fact that this additional and exponentially wider
dissemination of her alleged unprofessional attitudes occurred only after the
university sanctioned her.118
Commenters that have studied social media forms have pointed to the
multiplicity of uses to which Facebook users put their online expressions.
One scholar refers to the “endemic” narcissism of many Facebook users,
whose primary goals are to become famous—or infamous—within their
ever-widening social circles.119 Another identifies internet-facilitated
speech as “the core of how [young people] understand communication with
each other.”120 The latter understanding ironically suggests that the
frequency of users’ Friends’ status updates, combined with the frequency
with which all users check in with (and, by extension, mentally dismiss)
what their Facebook friends post, actually robs individual posts of their
noteworthiness.121 In other words, Facebook statuses are so public—or
rather, so many of them are so equally public—that they lose their function
as potentially disruptive public statements.122 Thus, it is highly unlikely
that any one Facebook post, no matter how scathing or offensive, could be
“sufficiently noteworthy that the student body would react to it in a manner
that could be disruptive to the school campus.”123

“Facebook posts that could be viewed by thousands of Facebook users”) with Tatro I, 800
N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. App. 2011) (“Tatro’s Facebook settings allowed her ‘friends’ and
‘friends of friends’ to view these postings; Tatro acknowledges that this group includes
hundreds of people.”).
118. See Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d at 513 (“Tatro, believing that she had been suspended,
attempted to bring attention to her punishment by reporting the incident to, and sharing her
Facebook posts with, the news media.”).
119. Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.
L. & TECH 1, 16 (2007).
120. Bryan Starrett, Tinker’s Facebook Profile: A New Test for Protecting Student
Cyber Speech, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 212, 225 (2009).
121. See id. at 233 (describing the second prong of a new two part test to apply the
Tinker framework to various forms of internet speech).
122. See id. (describing the effect of new Facebook posts by individual users on
members of their online networks).
123. Id.
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F. Speech Restriction in Governmentally-Licensed Professions and Public
Employees
As a somewhat corollary matter for the purposes of this Note, there
have been cases where the Supreme Court has addressed the idea that the
state’s licensure of a professional entails a licensee to speak in a
professional capacity. In this sense, the “speech” regulated by the licensure
scheme is typically the communication between the licensee professional
and his or her client-customer.124 The most prominent and easily
understood examples are lawyers, whose written and spoken speech acts
constitute legal advice subject to regulation when the listener is a client,125
and physicians, whose written and spoken speech acts can constitute
medical advice when the listener is a patient.126 The Supreme Court has
addressed this form of speech regulation in two prominent cases, both
involving speech prohibited by statute because it involved solicitation for
services.127 While these cases apparently address only whether the state can
regulate who can offer professional services through speech acts that create
a professional relationship (and which are thus not pure speech, but rather
“speech incidental to conduct”),128 the analysis that leads to the Court’s
conclusions is illuminating for the light it sheds on the legitimate
government interests that give rise to the speech restrictions within the
professions.129
124. See Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First
Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 910–11 (2000) (deriving from Lowe v. SEC, 472
U.S. 181 (1985), a case involving unlicensed investment advisors, that advice must be both
“person to person” and “characteristic dependent,” in the sense that it responds to a specific
client’s needs, to fall within the government’s ability to regulate it through licensing).
125. See id. at 893–95 (noting both expressive and non-expressive quality of lawyers’
advice to, and action on behalf of, clients).
126. See id. at 894 (“When a doctor writes a prescription for a patient, she is doing
more than simply recommending a remedy. The prescription has legal significance because
it authorizes a pharmacist to deliver a[n otherwise illegal] prescription medication to the
patient . . . .”).
127. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting
that “the state may . . . determine . . . who makes a business or a livelihood of soliciting
funds or memberships for unions”); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449
(1978) (holding that a state may sanction lawyers for the in-person solicitation of clients).
128. Kry, supra note 124, at 891.
129. See id. at 890 (arguing that by requiring licensing of professionals before they can
enter certain types of speech-dependent relationships, states enact a kind of “prior restraint”
on this kind of speech). Kry’s argument is weakened in light of his own analysis that these
speech acts do more than communicate information, but in fact create legal relationships, see
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It is unclear whether a state should sanction a licensed professional for
giving bad advice—such situations typically give rise to the private right of
action (malpractice) by the client against the licensee.130 State lawyer
sanctions, for example, are more common for failure to abide by standards
of conduct incident to the substance of the lawyer-client relationship (such
as failure to maintain proper records or improper disclosure of confidential
information). Malpractice is a private tort; ineffective assistance of counsel
is a legal remedy. Courts are split as to whether a lawyer’s expressive outof-court statements violate civility rules.131
Viewing professional students as quasi-employees by virtue of their
courses of study would afford them even less Constitutional protection than
even students typically enjoy. Public employees may have their speech
rights limited substantially by their government employers.132
Traditionally, the Court has authorized a balancing test “between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen . . . and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.”133
Notably, however, the Constitutionallyprotected interests of such employees extend only to speech “on matters of
public concern.”134 Private speech that involves “only matters of personal
interest,” by contrast, receives no special First Amendment protection
infra note 125 and accompanying text. The general idea of profession-licensing tends to
suggest only a gate-keeping, rather than a case-by-case censoring, function of the
appropriate restrictions.
130. See id. at 906 (suggesting that Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), a case
involving unlicensed investment advisors, “can be read to suggest that government
regulation of professional speech is permissible only when the communication occurs in the
context of a fiduciary relationship”).
131. See Justices of the App. Div., 1st Dept. v. Erdmann, 33 N.Y. 2d 559, 559–60
(reversing disciplinary action against an attorney for “isolated instances of . . . vulgar and
insulting words” in reference to a judge, published in a magazine article”), State Bar v.
Semaan, 508 S.W. 2d 429, 431–32 (Tex. App. 1974) (affirming lower court finding that
letter to the editor calling trial judge “‘a midget among giants’” in reference to other,
allegedly wiser judges was not misconduct); but see Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.
2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980) (“We are not alone in our opinion that by coming to the bar an
attorney incurs the ethical obligation not to bring the bench and bar into disrepute by
unfounded public criticism.”).
132. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“[I]t cannot be gainsaid
that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general.”).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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beyond that existing between an employee and a private employer.135 Thus,
while a teacher may not be disciplined for writing a letter to the local
newspaper criticizing the school board’s handling of fund-raising
proposals,136 a district attorney may be fired for circulating a questionnaire
to coworkers about a supervisor’s office policies.137
One employee speech case is particularly noteworthy for its potential
relevance to students like Tatro. In U.S. v. National Treasury Employees
Union,138 the Court struck down a ban on honoraria for public employees’
literary products that fell outside the scope of their official duties.139 The
Court protected the employee’s right to receive compensation for their work
on the grounds that it fell “within the protected category of citizen comment
on matters of public concern rather than employee comment on matters
related to personal status in the workplace.”140 Critical to the Court’s
analysis were that the statutory prohibition on payment imposed a
substantial burden on the employees’ expressive activity141 and the fact that
the activities described “were addressed to a public audience, were made
outside the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to their
government employment.”142 While Justice Stevens referred in his majority
opinion to notable federal employee-authors Nathaniel Hawthorne, Walt
135. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
136. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (requiring “proof of false statements knowingly or
recklessly made” before a public school teacher may be dismissed when public statements
regard “issues of public importance”).
137. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (holding that state district attorney’s office did not
violate the First Amendment rights of employee who circulated a questionnaire “most
accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy”).
138. U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (holding that
provision in Ethics and Government Act that prohibited federal employees from receiving
payment for giving speeches or writing articles violated employees’ First Amendment
rights).
139. See id. at 461–62 (describing some of the employees jobs and literary products).
Some examples cited by the court included, e.g., “a lawyer for the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission who . . . published articles on Russian history . . . [a] mail handler [who] had
given lectures on the Quaker religion . . . [and a] microbiologist at the Food and Drug
Administration [who] had earned almost $3,000 per year writing articles and making radio
and television appearances reviewing dance performances.” Id.
140. Id. at 466.
141. See id. at 469 (“Publishers compensate authors because compensation provides a
significant incentive toward more expression. By denying respondents that incentive, the
honoraria ban induces them to curtail their expression if they wish to continue working for
the Government.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
142. Id. at 466.
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Whitman, and Herman Melville,143 none of the identified plaintiffs who
challenged the statute were poets or novelists.
These cases draw distinctions between the kinds of expressive activity
that may bring a public employer’s powers closer to those of a private
employer; just because the government or its proxy can fire an employee
for certain speech does not mean that the employee is subject to civil
liability for that speech.144
Public employees do not enjoy First
Amendment rights that private employees do not, only a relationship with
their employer that is influenced by Constitutional rights. In that sense, the
situation is somewhat analogous to the distinction between private and
public-school students.
An argument could be made that because the state is training
professional students at public universities to serve in publicly regulated
professions, similar standards should apply.145 Assuming that Tatro’s
comments about her cadaver specimen do not constitute expressions on
matters of public concern, then, the university, acting as a quasi-employer,
would be justified in disciplining her. This interpretation is strengthened if
the posts are determined to be related to her “employment” in the sense that
they would not have come into being but for her university-facilitated
presence in the anatomy lab.146 Important differences between professional
143. See id. at 464 (“Respondents have yet to make comparable contributions to
American culture [to those of Whitman, Hawthorne, and Melville], but they share with these
great artists important characteristics that are relevant to the issue we confront.”). Justice
Stevens did not identify whether the common issues encompassed the equivalence of
creative and scholarly work for the purposes of determining what constitutes matters of
public concern. One might wonder whether subject matter is a relevant factor—whether, for
example, an employee who could not be disciplined for writing a novel about the dark heart
of the human soul could be fired for starring in pornographic films. The latter case may
soon find its way into the federal courts. See Wendy Leung, Oxnard Teacher, Fired for
Performing in Porn Films, Appeals to Court to Get her Job Back, VENTURA COUNTY STAR,
Feb. 22, 2013, available at www.vcstar.com/news2013/feb/22/oxnard-teacher-fired-forperforming-in-porn-to/ (describing pending California state-court appeal of public middle
school teacher dismissed for taking pornographic film roles during eight months prior to
employment).
144. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,147 (“We in no sense suggest that [employee]
speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression
which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit and punish
such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction.”).
145. See Waldman, supra note 8, at 414–18 (analyzing in greater detail, and ultimately
rejecting, the “public employee analogy” of professional students).
146. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006) (“Restricting speech that owes
its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise

WHAT YOU SIGN UP FOR

575

students at public universities and professional public employees must alter
this analysis, however.
On the one hand, professional students—especially those not involved
in direct client contact through a clinical education program—are not true
employees.147 Nor are they yet licensed professionals in their field, fully
subject to licensing requirements. On the other, even non-clinicallyengaged professional students are arguably in the process of being initiated
into publicly-licensed professions by means, in these cases, of government
entities. Without the public university’s approval, in the form of a passing
grade, these students cannot enter their chosen professions in the first
place.148
As Tatro’s avowed difficulties in finding employment149
subsequent to her dispute with the University illustrate, professional
programs can more closely resemble a pipeline with few honorable exits
than a branching path that can only open opportunities as the student
progresses chronologically through the course of study. The control a
public university exercises over its professional students’ future licensure
would seem to necessitate either more control over student speech and
behavior (emphasizing the government’s role in protecting its citizens from
unqualified professionals), or less control (emphasizing the student’s
relatively vulnerable role as an as-yet uneducated aspirant who has placed
so much control over her future livelihood in a government institution’s
hands). In any event, the courts in Ward, Keeton, and Tatro have not
applied professional or public-employee doctrines to the case of
professional student cases, relying instead on the deference traditionally
afforded universities in prescribing curriculum.

of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”) (emphasis
added).
147. Several cases illuminate an importantly different situation: when a student’s
clinical placement is outside the school. In these cases, courts have applied the employeremployee rules and upheld sanctions that resulted from a clinical student being “fired” from
his or her outside “employer.” See Waldman, surpa note 8, at 398–401 (discussing various
cases).
148. See, supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
149. See Kaitlin Walker & Katherine Lymn, From Facebook to Court: U Defends
Discipline, MINN. DAILY, Feb. 13, 2012, available at http://www.mndaily.co
m/2012/02/13/facebook-court-u-defends-discipline (stating Tatro’s belief that she has “had
trouble getting jobs and internships since the case began”).
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IV. Tatro and the Professional Student Cases

A. The Emergence of “Established Professional Standards” in University
Conduct Cases
While the specific facts in Tatro may be idiosyncratic, the case arises
in the broader context of public universities’ struggle to determine how, if
at all, online student speech may be constrained by conduct codes. It is
particularly noteworthy that the Minnesota Supreme Court abandoned the
lower appeals court’s analysis along the Tinker line of substantial
disruption cases, and instead crafted a new standard related to established
professional conduct codes.
The new test may have been a departure in the procedural posture of
Tatro, but similar tests had been applied in other cases.150 Commentator
Neal H. Hutchens has used the Ward and Keeton cases to illustrate the rise
of this trend in allowing expanded restriction of student speech according to
professional-conduct code-related speech, arguing that such standards are
constitutionally appropriate. As Hutchens points out, the district courts
granted summary judgment in these cases on the grounds that “[t]he
judiciary’s review of academic decisions is limited.”151
Limited judicial review of “academic” decisions—as distinguished
from behavioral “disciplinary” decisions—stems from the so-called
“academic freedom” protections of universities.152 Somewhat ironically,
“academic freedom” so characterized is based on the university’s right to
define its curriculum—a right seen as necessary by the courts and derived
from the first amendment itself.153 The University of Minnesota, in reacting
to Tatro’s conduct through giving her a failing grade, was able to

150. See Neal H. Hutchens, Comment, A Delicate Balance: Faculty Authority to
Incorporate Professionalism Standards into the Curriculum Versus College and University
Students’ First Amendment Rights, 270 ED. LAW REP. 371, (2011) (summarizing cases in
which courts upheld speech restrictions based on professional conduct standards for
professional students).
151. Ward v. Wilbanks, No. 09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428, at 15 (E.D. Mich. July
26, 2010).
152. See Jack E. Byrom, Note, To Love and Die in Dixon: An Argument for Stricter
Judicial Review in Cases of Academic Misconduct, 31 REV. LITIG. 147 (2012) (providing
background of academic/disciplinary distinction).
153. See Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that a university “has
discretion to engage in its own expressive activity of prescribing its curriculum”).
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characterize its actions as “academic” rather than “disciplinary”—and gain
the protection of a much more deferential judicial posture.154
The professional standards cases problematize this dual standard.155 In
courses of study aimed at training students for regulated professions—
including programs in counseling, law, and mortuary science—students
must be taught the relevant standards of professional conduct. When these
students move beyond the classroom and into clinical training, their
adherence to the professional standards can, arguably, be legitimately
imported into the curriculum; that is to say, a student’s ability to adhere to
the rules of her profession not only protects her clients, but also
demonstrates her mastery of her program’s course content.
Such a characterization, however, places an important burden on
university faculty and administrators not to blur the line between
curriculum and discipline. Cases like Ward and Keeton—where students’
alleged speech-related misconduct occurs, or threatens to occur, in the
context of contact with an actual client and is directly related to their
professional activities—are, arguably, less “close,” in the jurisprudential
sense, than cases like Tatro, where the “speech” occurs in a classroom
setting and the student is engaged in an educational activity insulated from
the public (such as a laboratory). Of course, the preceding analysis assumes
that a situation like Tatro’s involves in-class conduct at all, ignoring the fact
that the Facebook posts were not actually made from the lab. For Tatro, the
appropriateness of a Facebook post depended on her status as a student—
her posts fell within the ambit of the mortuary science curriculum because
Tatro was enrolled in it. Setting such wide boundaries for what a student
can be graded on (and failed for) forces students constantly to second-guess
their actions on and off-campus, to wonder where and how—and why, in
particular instances—their performance is being evaluated. As the
professional speech cases discussed above point out, such behavioral
requirements are not even universally understood to apply to professionals
after they are licensed.
154. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 522 (“Although ‘a university’s interest in academic
freedom’ does not ‘immunize the university altogether from First Amendment challenges,’
courts have concluded that a university ‘has discretion to engage in its own expressive
activity of prescribing its curriculum’ and that it is appropriate to ‘defer[] to the university’s
expertise in defining academic standards and teaching students to meet them.’”) (quoting
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 950, 952 (9th Cir. 2002).
155. See Byrom, supra note 152, at 151 (suggesting that universities have disguised
disciplinary decisions as “academic” in order to avoid higher due process requirements).
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B. Problems Specific to Tatro II

1. Tatro II Is Not Consistent with the Emerging “Established Professional
Standards” Jurisprudence
Because it represents the furthest extent to which a court has stretched
a public university’s ability to punish a student for his or her speech, it is
not surprising that commentators and scholars have begun to cite it as part
of the jurisprudential trend that includes Ward and Keeton.156 Nonetheless,
Tatro is not a natural extension of the doctrine that appears to be
developing in these cases.
The students in both Ward and Keeton were sanctioned for expressions
that demonstrated an inability to abide by the ethical norms of their
profession as such—they said, openly, in conversations with their
professors and in classroom environments, that they could not counsel
LGBTQ clients.157 The expressions were about the student’s inability to
comply with the curriculum, and were addressed to faculty members and
other students in a curricular setting. Tatro, by contrast, posted comments
on Facebook that, while arguably unprofessional, were also in a sense nonprofessional, in the sense that they did not take place in the context of her
academic program. To the extent that they were about her laboratory work,
Tatro’s posts were expressions of her personal experiences and feelings
about that work. Tatro expressed no feelings about the disposition of
156. See, e.g., 19 AM. JUR. 2D. Proof of Facts § 5.5 (1979) (citing Tatro II for the
proposition that “allow[ing] student to continue in program while assigning her a failing
grade . . . was not arbitrary or a pretext for punishing student’s First Amendment rights. . .
.”). Perhaps even more troubling are references to Tatro II in the employment law context.
See RICHARD A. ROSS, 5A MINN. PRAC., METHODS OF PRACTICE § 4.50.10(B) (4th ed.)
(“While not an employment law case, Tatro [II] is indicative of claims a public employer
may face if they choose to discipline an employee for statements made on Facebook.”); see
also Eric Goldman, From Eric’s Blog, 17 No. 7 CYBERSPACE LAWYER 17 (2012) (citing
Tatro II to illustrate “problems with online discussions by people in the healthcare industry
literally from cradle . . . to grave”); but see 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 489
(citing Tatro II for the proposition that “[a] university cannot use a code of ethics as a
pretext for punishing a student’s protected speech”—presumably relying on the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s decision that applying the code of ethics was justified by Tatro’s status as a
professional student) (emphasis added).
157. See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 873 (11th Cir. 2011) (describing
memo from administrators detailing various “interactions with [Keeton] during classes,
papers written . . . for classes, and behaviors toward and comments to fellow students in
. . . classes); see also Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 731 (describing various communications
between Ward and her faculty supervisor on the subject of her clinical work).
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human remains, her willingness to practice her trade within the bounds of
professional guidelines, or details that could identify the donor of the
specimen upon which she worked.
2. The Disposition of Tatro II Is Inconsistent with its Holding
Noting that the universe of “legitimate pedagogical concerns” was so
broad as to capture “values like ‘discipline, courtesy, and respect for
authority,’” the Tatro II court explicitly rejected the pedagogical rational
basis standard of Hazelwood and its progeny as a test for assessing college
student Facebook posts.158 The court did not explicate in great detail the
reasons it found such values inappropriate to the facts or context in Tatro.
Arguably, however, the value protected by the professional conduct
standard at issue was similar in scope and character to those values the
court saw as too broad in Hazelwood. The court concluded that “dignity
and respect for the human cadaver constitutes an established professional
conduct standard for mortuary science professionals”159 and that Tatro’s
Facebook posts were a violation of that standard. In another case involving
the posting to a student’s Facebook page of material deemed objectionable
under a professional conduct standard, a Kansas District Court remarked
that “students in publicly supported schools [should] not be held to vague
standards that are interpreted in arbitrary and unpredictable ways that
ultimately hinge on the personal interpretations, feelings, and personal
morals of those who are imposing them.”160 While it may be obvious that
Facebook posts comparing a cadaver to the title character of Weekend at
Bernie’s are disrespectful, the issue of whether or not “disrespect” is a
validly quantifiable pedagogical benchmark seems equally subject to
unpredictable interpretation.
Furthermore, while the court saw fit to point out that Tatro was well
aware of the restrictions that her participation in the course would place on
her online social media posts, it also stated in a footnote that this reasoning
should not be taken to mean that a student can “contract out” of First
Amendment Protections:

158. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d at 518 (quoting Polling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th
Cir. 1989)).
159. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Minn. 2012).
160. Byrnes v. Johnson Cnty. Cmty. Coll., No. 10 2690, 2011 WL 166715 (Jan. 19,
2011).
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[o]ur analysis of Tatro’s free speech argument does not depend on
Tatro’s agreement to restrict her speech as a condition of participating in
the laboratory courses. We concur with Tatro that a university cannot
impose a course requirement that forces a student to agree to otherwise
invalid restrictions on her free speech.161

The exact meaning of the distinction is not made explicit, but it would
seem to follow that “academic program rules, narrowly tailored and directly
related to established professional conduct standards” would have applied
to Tatro whether she agreed to them or not.162
3. Tatro’s Posts Problematize the Distinctions of Earlier Cases
Rather than statements of religious or political conviction, Tatro’s
offending Facebook posts were personal, if arguably off-color. In past
cases, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that speech falling into
some category of artistic expression need not be political in order to gain
First Amendment protection—indeed, it need not even make sense.163
The court agreed that the university was free to hold Tatro to
“academic program rules requiring the respectful treatment of human
cadavers.”164 Such rules did not violate Tatro’s First Amendment rights
because they were “directly related to established professional conduct
standards”165 and “narrowly tailored” inasmuch as they only sanctioned
public comment.166 Interestingly, the fact that Tatro publicized her own
Facebook posts to the media only after she believed herself to have been
suspended from the university—during the police investigation—was a
factor in the court’s assessment of how widely the posts had been
disseminated.167
161. Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d at 521, n.6.
162. Id. at 521.
163. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995) (“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized
message,’ . . . would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock,
music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”) (internal citation
omitted).
164. Id. at 523.
165. Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 521–22 (Minn. 2012) (comparing class conduct
requirements to statutory provisions governing the conduct of mortuary professionals).
166. Id. at 523.
167. Id. (describing sanctions as narrowly tailored as applied).
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V. Potential Ramifications of Tatro II in College Free Speech
Jurisprudence
A. Universities Can Capture Too Much Student Behavior as “Curricular”
Part of the problem in academic discipline cases is that a university’s
ability to assign grades to students is characterized, at least in part, as a First
Amendment freedom.168 University professors cannot be constrained by
legislatures as to what they may or may not teach, which has created a
sphere of protection for their curricular decisions about what students must
read, and how they may appropriately respond. The doctrine has expanded
to conclude that professors may even require students to engage in specific
speech acts that contradict their own beliefs.169 More broadly, universities
are presumed to have a First Amendment right to determine the content of
its curriculum.170 Interpolating this right to individual programs or
departments is not an unreasonable extension of the academic freedom
doctrine.
It is unclear whether college students’ adult status and independence
grants them more or less speech protection than secondary students.
Colleges are arguably less obviously invested in the moral training of their
students than high schools are, and college students are more likely to be
able to benefit from a marketplace of ideas that includes crude and
unprofessional expressions. However, the theory that college students
voluntarily join their educational communities—and thus have a degree of
notice of behavioral standards to which they will be expected to adhere—
has appeared in the professional standards cases. This is certainly in
keeping with the notion that in joining a particular profession—even a
governmentally-regulated one—citizens can sacrifice certain rights.171
168. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d at 522 (citing Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir.
2002) for the proposition that a university “has discretion to engage in its own expressive
activity of prescribing its curriculum”).
169. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1291–92 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“Requiring an acting student, in the context of a classroom exercise, to speak the words of a
script as written is no different than requiring that a law or history student argue a position
with which he disagrees.”).
170. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Curriculum choices are a
form of school speech, giving schools considerable flexibility in designing courses and
policies and in enforcing them so long as they amount to reasonable means of furthering
legitimate educational ends.”).
171. See supra Part III.F (describing professional licensing and effect on speech rights).
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One thing seems certain: the restrictions placed on Tatro’s speech by
the mortuary science lab’s rules would likely not survive the Supreme
Court’s usual First Amendment scrutiny. The fact that “[t]he anatomy lab
rules allowed ‘respectful but discreet [c]onversational language of cadaver
dissection outside laboratory’ but prohibited ‘blogging’”172 may be taken as
a content restriction in time, place, and manner clothing—even in private
conversations or conversations occurring within the lab itself, the
governmental “rule” would seem always to prohibit comments that are not
“respectful.” Such a statement, “made at any time, in any place, to any
person” would seemingly have difficulty surviving the strict Constitutional
scrutiny called for outside the unique Constitutional setting of schools.173
Due to this confusion, the better rule would be to treat college student
speech as though it were adult speech. Students who attended private
institutions would be afforded the same kind of notice of their lessened
speech rights that they have of limited due process and religious
freedoms.174
B. Institutional Processes May Create an Imperfect Record for Appellate
Review
In all three of the professional standards cases, judicial review
occurred only after students exhausted internal university grievance
procedures.175 This has the potential to create two problems—the internal
processes may create an uncertain record for appellate review, and
universities may serve first as arbiters of the student’s dispute and later as
the opposing party when the case is litigated in court.
Several differences are apparent in the factual summaries of the two
available Tatro decisions. In the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the number
172. Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012).
173. See U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 1537, 2547 (2012) (emphasizing the allencompassing nature of the speech prohibited in the Stolen Valor Act for the purposes of
defining its prohibitions as content-based restrictions triggering strict judicial scrutiny).
174. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lecture, Freedom of Speech at a Private
Religious University, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 104 (2008) (outlining differences
in First Amendment rights of public and private universities).
175. See Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 2012) (describing initial review of the
sanctions by the Campus Committee on Student Behavior and affirmation by university
provost); Ward, 667 F.3d at 731 (describing formal review committee composition and
process); Keeton, 664 F.3d at 869–70 (describing formulation of student’s “remediation
plan”).
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of people to have access to Tatro’s Facebook page is said to be “hundreds”
of people.176 The Minnesota Supreme Court sets the approximate number
at “thousands.”177 The Supreme Court opinion also makes no mention of
the full measure of sanctions leveled by the university and upheld by the
provost. While the appeals court’s opinion makes reference to a required
ethics course, a letter of apology, and a “complete psychiatric
evaluation,”178 the Supreme Court only reviews the seriousness of a “failing
grade.”179 If “the seriousness of the consequences” is an important factor
when assessing a university’s potential suppression of a student’s First
Amendment expression rights, then the significant difference between these
two sets of sanctions would seem to be relevant to that analysis.180
Finally, when initial determinations made against students are subject
to review by the courts, university officials may not be fair arbiters of
students’ rights. As long as a free speech dispute can be captured by the
court’s deferential curricular decisions jurisprudence, faculty and
administrators will know that their sanctions are likely to be upheld by the
courts. While this may be appropriate in the grade challenge context, when
the student behavior under review is related to traditional academic issues
like plagiarism, cheating, or a challenge to an assignment grade, it seems
considerably less appropriate when it comes to off-campus electronic
speech that does not affect the student’s completion of course requirements.
VI. What Course Should Universities Steer on “Unprofessional” Student
Speech?
A. A Best Practices Approach
Professionally inappropriate speech acts by students enrolled in
professional degree programs poses a unique challenge for public colleges
and universities. While professors who view themselves as their students
176. See Tatro I, 800 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. App. 2001) (“Tatro acknowledges that
[the group of people with access to her Facebook posts] includes hundreds of people.”).
177. Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d at 523.
178. Tatro I, 800 N.W. 2d at 815.
179. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d at 524 (“. . . Tatro was not expelled or even suspended
from the Mortuary Science Program. The University allowed Tatro to continue in
the . . . program with a failing grade in one laboratory course.”).
180. Id. (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 52–53 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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mentors (and administrators who see themselves as guardians of the
institution’s reputation among members of the fields its professional
schools train) may instinctively want to shape and correct such lapses,
higher education institutions are ultimately best suited by an amoral
approach to student speech acts even when those acts arguably (or even
clearly) cross the professional line.
Higher education institutions—even private colleges and
universities—are beholden to a reputation for openness to controversial and
sometimes blatantly inappropriate conduct. While the judicial definition of
“academic freedom” may be limited to the university’s sovereign power to
determine what its curriculum means, popular opinion and American
folkway extend this definition to mean “professors can say what they want
and not get fired.”181 Students at universities may have the right to feel the
same way, both as citizens and members of an academic community; often,
in fact, they are encouraged to feel this way.182 Increasingly (and
unfortunately), however, they do not—a recent study found that almost
forty percent of Minnesota college and university students do not feel as
though they have the right to speak their minds about controversial subjects
on campus.183

181. See Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom, 36 J. C. & U. L. 791, 820
(“[Professors who] invoke academic freedom by virtue of their status . . . collide . . . with
one of the fundamental precepts of constitutional law: that constitutional rights are not
profession-specific and membership in a particular profession does not bestow constitutional
privileges unavailable to citizens at large.”).
182. See AM. COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES & ALUMNI, AT A CROSSROADS: PUBLIC HIGHER
EDUCATION IN MINNESOTA 12, (2010), available at http://www.goacta.org
/images/download/at_a_crossroads.pdf (citing University of Minnesota Student Conduct
Code definition of “Academic Freedom” as “the freedom to discuss all relevant matters in
the classroom . . . and to speak or write without institutional discipline or restraint on matters
of public concern as well as on matters related to professional duties . . . .”). The current
version of the document cited by the American Council of Trustees & Alumni report has
apparently been updated to remove explicit references to academic freedom, and instead
states that “[t]he University seeks an environment . . . that is protective of free inquiry. . . . ”
UNIV. OF MINN. BD. OF REGENTS, STUDENT CONDUCT CODE § I(b), amended Oct. 11, 2012,
available at http://www1.umn.edu/regents/policies/academic/Student_Conduct_Code.pdf.
Interestingly, the document also contains the proviso that “[t]he University supports and is
guided by state and federal law while also setting its own standards of conduct for its
academic community.” Id. at § I(d).
183. See id. at 16 (reporting that 39.1% of Minnesota college and university students
agreed with the statement “On my campus, there are certain topics or viewpoints that are offlimits.”).
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As the Tatro case demonstrates, public colleges and universities have
little to gain, beyond proof of their own power, from media-fueled street
fights with students over tasteless Facebook posts, which create the
impression of a David-versus-Goliath dynamic even when the institutional
position rests on firm legal ground.184 In addition to the risk that it might
lose the legal battle—even when that risk is low—institutions must face
potential public opposition from student groups185 and members of their
own faculty,186 whose statements to the media on the subject will
undoubtedly be protected on First Amendment grounds. Once the matter
hits the press, any statements made in defense of a disciplined student will
be protected as speech on matters of public concern—which, if nothing
else, muddies the rhetorical waters as to the appropriateness of the original
student speech.
Another problematic aspect of the student-institutional social media
relationship evidenced in Tatro II is the lack of a clear social media policy
addressing hybrid forms such as Facebook. Amanda’s class syllabus
forbade “blogging” about cadavers, but made no specific mention of
Facebook or other personal social media sites—the only reference to
Facebook occurred during the class’s orientation session.187 While the
distinction was unimportant to the Minnesota Supreme Court, it is
incredibly important in the professions, where individuals can (and,
according to most experts giving good advice, should) manage their social
184. See, e.g., William Creeley, In Troubling Ruling, Minnesota Court of Appeals
Upholds Punishment of Student for Facebook Posts, FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
EDUCATION, July 12, 2011, available at http://thefire.org/article/13368.html (illustrating
negative national attention Tatro I drew to the University of Minnesota from a public interest
group).
185. See Editorial, Free Speech Comes First, MINN. DAILY, Feb. 15, 2012, available at
http://www.mndaily.com/2012/02/15/free-speech-comes-first (expressing the editorial
board’s concern that financial motivations might influence the University’s motivation for
punishing student speech, and asking “[w]hat will happen the next time a student criticizes
an aspect of University research or wasteful administration that . . . reduces a donor’s
willingness to give?”).
186. See Kaitlin Walker & Katherine Lymn, From Facebook to Court: U Defends
Discipline, MINN. DAILY, Feb. 13, 2012, available at http://www.mndaily.com/
2012/02/13/facebook-court-u-defends-discipline (relaying University of Minnesota media
law professor Jane Kirtley’s concern that the then-current student conduct code may violate
the First Amendment).
187. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012) (“The instructor for the anatomy
lab course testified that ‘blogging’ was intended to be a broad term and that she explained to
the students during orientation that blogging included Facebook and Twitter.”).
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media presence in such a way as to allow for a vibrant, stress-relieving
private life that does not present the potential for public professional
embarrassment. By some accounts, “gallows humor” is not only prevalent
in mortuary schools, but is recognized by practitioners as a healthy way to
deal with the pressures of the traditionally somber profession.
Discussion on the proper role of universities in shaping their students’
use of social media abounds. Often, and unsurprisingly, the focus of such
“best practices” pieces is the increasing problem of cyber-bullying.188
Unfortunately, too many of these strategies focus on keeping students from
doing things that might embarrass their educational patrons.189 If students
should be aware that their social media posts may put them at odds with
policies in their academic programs, they need clear notice of these
policies.190
Simply put, colleges and universities—especially, but not only, public
ones—have no proper business managing the private interactions between
their students and the larger world via non-school-sponsored social media
applications. Attempts to do so obscure the institution’s role—at best
making them out to be enforcers of a moral agenda and at worst Orwellian
oppressors of student speech. Often as not, public outcry over a student’s
sanction is what brings these incidents into the public sphere in the first
place—not the student’s initial conduct.
When this happens, the
appropriateness of the student’s original act (or speech act) becomes
obscured by the appropriateness of the institution’s response—making the
institution lose, with at least some constituencies, even when it wins, time
after time, in the courts. And unlike the courts, which can be forced into
unpopular decisions by precedent (such as the precedent to give deference
188. See, e.g., Sara Jane Shanahan & Jessica Gray Kelly, Commentary, How to Protect
Your Students from Cyberbullying, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED., Mar. 25, 2012, available at
http://chronicle.com/article/How-to-Protect-Your-Students/131306/ (suggesting incorporation of social media policies intended to “send an unequivocal message that they will
identify and hold accountable students who seek to intimidate others . . . through digital
communications” akin to those covering “academic dishonesty”).
189. See, e.g., Reynol Junco, The Need for Student Social Media Policies, EDUCAUSE
REVIEW, Jan/Feb 2011 60–61, available at http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/
ERM1118.pdf (encouraging policymakers to incorporate student conduct and hate speech
codes into clearly-articulated social media policies).
190. See AM. COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES & ALUMNI, supra note 182, at 16 (reporting that
only 4.9% of Minnesota students disagreed with the statement “Students feel free to state
their social or political views through social media, such as Facebook or Myspace, without
getting in trouble on my campus.”).
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to academic administrative disciplinary boards), colleges and universities
are free to make their own policy about student social media speech—
including the best policy, to leave it alone.
B. Extending Alvarez: A “Stolen Professionalism” Approach
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided U.S. v. Alvarez,191 invalidating the
“Stolen Valor” law that made false claims to have earned certain military
decorations a federal crime.192 The respondent was a member of a
Claremont, California municipal office who claimed, in numerous public
meetings, to have been wounded several times in combat and been awarded
the nation’s highest military honor, the Medal of Honor.193 The Court
determined that the statute’s broad reach—to encompass “a false statement
made at any time, in any place, to any person[,]” regardless of the speaker’s
intent—and lack of any other condition precedent made the law a contentbased restriction on speech, and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny.194
Moreover, there was no “long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of
proscription” of false statements on no other basis than their falsity.195 In
striking down the statute, the Court, per Justice Kennedy, spoke in strong
terms about the need to protect speech that was not only offensive, but also
unambiguously false:
Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is
sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the
speech was used to gain a material advantage [i.e., to cause a cognizable
harm to another], it would give government a broad censorial power
unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition.
The mere potential for the exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the
First amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are
to remain a foundation of our freedom.196

The Court’s language in search of a compelling governmental interest
is, given the vastly different context, surprisingly instructive of the
191. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act’s
prohibition of false claims to military honors was an unconstitutional content-based
restriction on free speech).
192. See id. at 2543 (describing the substance of the Stolen Valor Act).
193. See id. at 2542 (relaying facts of the case below).
194. Id. at 2547.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2547–48.
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professional student speech conundrum. “Public recognition of valor and
noble sacrifice by men and women in uniform” the Court wrote, “reinforces
the pride and national resolve that the military relies upon to fulfill its
mission.”197 Arguably, a very similar concern animates the public’s interest
in maintaining the reputation of members of the licensed professions. If a
false statement is analogous to a statement that brings potential shame to
one’s own profession (or, as in Alvarez, a statement that brings shame to a
profession one does not belong to), then the blanket prohibition of such
statements may be entitled to similar constitutional protection.
Even if, for some reason, unprofessional statements are not analogous
to false ones, imagining statements satisfying both criteria, and that
nonetheless fit within the Court’s Alvarez analytic framework, is not
difficult. What if Tatro had made the following statement, online or off:
“All mortuary science students at the University of Minnesota are members
of a Satanic cult”? Or, “Some mortuary science students at the University
of Minnesota use their donated cadavers to perform Satanic rituals”? The
first of these statements is likely both defamatory and false; the second
clearly implicates the professional conduct standard—treating the dead with
respect—that Tatro was found to have violated. Surely it is more
damaging, if believed, to the reputation of the mortuary profession than an
oblique reference to a limp late-eighties comedy. Yet, because the
statements are false, they do not indicate actual violation of the code except
as pure speech. And the Supreme Court’s analysis in Alvarez suggests that,
as such, they would be protected but for some professional licensure
exception to the First Amendment.
Alvarez provides one other potentially useful analytic tool for use in
school speech cases: an expressed judicial preference for “counterspeech”
that will achieve substantially the same goal as prohibition.198 “The remedy
for speech that is false is speech that is true. . . . The response to the
unreasoned is the rational; to the uniformed, the enlightened; to the
straightout lie, the simple truth.”199 Speech out of character with the
codified standards of the speaker’s profession—as long as that speech does
not harm the interests of another200—would seem to fit within the Court’s
197. Id. at 2548.
198. Id. at 2549.
199. Id. at 2550.
200. Arguably, some professional conduct standards establish speech restrictions that
safeguard not the profession, but the physical and financial interests of others, such as
fiduciaries. See, e.g., MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (prohibiting lawyers
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analysis. As to Tatro, it would be hard to argue that a statement to the
media about the inappropriateness of her remarks would have corrected
whatever damage her remarks inflicted on the University’s reputation,
given the vast degree of community respect enjoyed by the latter. And,
before any media correction would have been necessary—Tatro only
revealed her Facebook posts to the press after she was disciplined by the
University—the mortuary science program would likely have been able to
show students why the posts were inappropriate by means of a dialogic
seminar of some kind. At the university, Justice Brandeis can be taken
literally: “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”201 Surely universities, by
definition the most sophisticated institutions of learning around and the
intellectual home of our greatest and most persuasive minds, should be the
last to pass up an opportunity to teach.
VII. Conclusion
If, as Justice Holmes said, “the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,”202 then the
best test of the attitudes of our professionals towards their clients, alive or
dead, may be the power of those attitudes to withstand public scrutiny. The
fact that a student can be punished for expressing an unprofessional attitude
does not necessarily guarantee the eradication of that thought—especially if
punishment creates a sense of persecution in the offender, as is often the
case.203 If anything, Amanda Tatro’s vindication in the press and cause
celeb status on education rights blogs teaches us this lesson. That a student
is a professional student (as opposed to what, we might ask—an
from disclosing confidential information); R. 1.13(g) (requiring lawyers to inform corporate
officers of institutional clients that they represent the institution and not necessarily its
officers); R. 4.1 (prohibiting a lawyer from making false statements of material fact or law
to a third party in the course of representation of a client).
201. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1972).
202. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
203. See Deborah Selby & Sharon Murphy, Graded or Degraded: Perceptions of
Letter-Grading for Mainstreamed Learning-Disabled Students, 16 B.C. J. OF SPECIAL ED.
92–104 (1992) (collecting research across all student levels and showing that students who
receive failing grades often withdraw from the learning process or justify grades as
meaningless).
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“academic” or even “real” student) would seem to offer a distinction
unworthy of a new exception to First Amendment protections. That
distinction appears to be hardening, however. Professors and students—the
core constituency of the “academy” as we understand it—should be aware
of what they be signing up for, and what they may be signing away.

